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INTEGRATION OR IMITATION?
EU policy towards its Eastern Neighbours
Introduction
The European Union’s policy towards the six post-Soviet countries, Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, has entered a new phase
since 2004. These countries, in becoming the immediate neighbourhood of the
EU, found themselves the focus of an integration policy. However, this policy de
facto includes no membership offer, even with regard to the European partners.
Although this has not been stated explicitly, many facts indicate that the EU’s
intention has been to determine the final Eastern borders of the European
Community in a ‘soft’ way, i.e. while minimising economic and political divides. 
Does the European Union’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours have any
chance of success? To what extent can the objective of ‘external integration’,
i.e. the adoption of EU standards by its Eastern neighbours, be achieved?
The European Neighbourhood Policy is currently being reviewed and the revo-
lutions in North Africa have triggered a fresh debate on this policy. Alongside
this process, Poland's forthcoming presidency of the EU (given that Poland
grants high priority to rapprochement with its Eastern neighbours) provides
yet another pretext for posing the above questions.
However, these considerations extend beyond current events and the EU calen -
dar. There are aspects of the central question, namely: Is the EU capable of ex -
port ing its own model of governance? This question is currently more focused
on the local than the global potential of the European Union. Can it continue
the process of ‘making Europe wider’?  
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This text formulates the thesis that Eastern Europe’s1 (EE) convergence to EU
standards in political and economic terms is an enormous challenge, which
requires great determination from both sides. Meanwhile, actions taken by the
EU so far prove that it does not see integration with its Eastern neighbours as
an issue important enough to warrant investing significant resources in this
process. At the same time, however, the EU – in part to maintain its credibility
or possibly due to political and bureaucratic inertia – is unlikely to relinquish
its policy of promoting its own model within its immediate neighbourhood.
A continuation of this dual strategy may lead to a pretence in which both the
EU and its Eastern partners will be merely imitating an integration. Both sides
will in fact be playing this game without focusing on achieving the goal and
without any hope of implementing it; Brussels in order to avoid an evident fail-
ure and cover up its weakness, and Eastern European countries in order to ex -
ploit this process for domestic political reasons and in relations with Russia. 
Although a revision of the previous EU policy is not a sufficient measure in
itself (since a great deal depends on the partner states), it appears to be neces-
sary for enabling progress on integration. The author points out three desirable
approaches and counsels against two inadvisable ones. Firstly, it would be worth -
while formulating a clear and attractive strategic message, which makes refer-
ences not to the concept of ‘neighbourhood’ but rather to the idea of a united
Europe. Contrary to broadly voiced concerns, this is possible without making
a clear offer of membership. Secondly, it is worth taking the risk of greater
diversification between ordinary partner states and those ready to treat the EU
as a social, economic or political model. The EU would have to pledge greater
openness to the latter countries in such issues as the movement of people,
access to the agricultural and services market, and possibilities for privileged
institutional co-operation. Thirdly, more emphasis should be placed on grass-
roots democratisation: aside from providing funding, it is necessary to encour-
age a greater openness to society at large in the six neighbour countries and to
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1 The six neighbour countries are usually referred to as Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus.
In turn, the term ‘Eastern Europe’ per se usually also covers Russia. However, the term ‘Eastern
Europe’ used in this text, for ease of reference, corresponds to the definition of this term used in the
declaration signed by the EU and the six neighbour states after the first Eastern Partnership summit
in Prague in 2009. The document defined all the partner states, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, as Eastern European countries.
use more flexible mechanisms aimed at developing self-reliance instead of de pen-
dence, alongside offers of firm support when it comes to civil dissent against
an authoritarian regime.  
Having embarked upon a more distinct and engaged policy, the EU will have
great er opportunities for resisting the temptation to which it has previously
succumbed to the creation of instruments which do not bring any added value.
Although they provide temporary substitutes for concrete actions, the continua -
tion of such a policy in the longer run often leads to even deeper bilateral frus-
tration. 
It does not seem advisable for now to declare a stronger engagement in the
area of ‘frozen conflicts’ (which many experts have recently encouraged). The EU
is still lacking the instruments and political will necessary to confront Russia
in this field. Given this situation, any attempts at intensifying the EU’s securi-
ty policy towards its Eastern neighbours are doomed to failure and may only
undermine the European Community’s credibility. 
*
This text consists of two parts. The first part, Eastern neighbourhood – how far
from the EU?, outlines the major challenges any strategy aimed at the region’s
drawing closer to the EU must face. The second part, The Eastern vector of neigh-
bourhood policy, analyses actions taken by the EU towards Ukraine, Belarus,
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan since they have been considered the
EU’s neighbours. At the end conclusions and recommendations for the future
are presented. This analysis intentionally refrains from referring to the differen -
ces in the policies towards the Eastern neighbours adopted by individual mem-
ber states and to the role particular institutions have played (the European
Com mission, the European Council, the European Parliament) in the develop-
ment of the European Union’s strategy. Obviously, those issues have had a great
impact on the EU’s actions. However, the subject of this text is the European
Community strategy, i.e. the actions taken by the EU on behalf of all its insti-
tutions and member states (regardless of their individual preferences). 
O S W  S t u d i e s
In
tr
o
d
u
c
ti
o
n
7
Executive Summary
The Eastern European countries have three major assets: 
(1) they are relatively functional and predictable so they appear unlikely to be -
come sources of crises which could pose a serious threat to the European Union’s
security; 
(2) the region has significant potential for grassroots democracy: over the past
decade, mass protests against election fixing took place in each of the countries
on at least one occasion, some of which ended in blocking attempts at deep-
ening authoritarian practices; 
(3) most of these countries also show significant potential related to their Euro -
pean identity. The development of closer relations with the EU enjoys strong
public support in most of the countries in this region. Although a major part of
the elite is not clearly resolved to integrate with the EU, political leaders in
Georgia and Moldova, and to some extent in Ukraine and Armenia, see the EU
as a ‘civilisational model’ worth copying. Most of these countries, despite the
lack of clear [membership] perspectives, feel they have the right to expect the
door to the European Community to remain open to them. 
Strong as those assets may be, the task of drawing Eastern Europe closer to the
EU is one of the toughest integration challenges. This is Europe’s poorest region,
where none of the countries has a political system which meets EU standards.
At the same time, the differences between individual Eastern European countries
and EU member states vary quite significantly. Moreover, proximity at the politi-
cal level does not entail similarity at the economic level. Paradoxically, the two
countries which are most distant from the EU in political terms, Belarus and
Azer baijan, are the richest ones and can boast the fastest economic growth
rates (in terms of GDP per capita). In turn the countries most assimilated to the
EU, which are seen as the leaders of the European Neighbourhood Policy, may
deem the past fifteen years as wasted time from the point of view of reducing
the economic gap between them and the European Union. Ukraine’s and Mol -
dova’s GDP per capita has increased since 1995 in comparison to the average EU
level by as little as 2–3%. Eastern Europe also has surprisingly weak economic
ties with the EU. The European Community’s largest partner in this re gion,
Ukraine, sends as much as three quarters of its exports to countries other than
EU member states. 
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Challenges in the context of integration policy not only result from the situation
in Eastern European countries but are also posed by an external actor, in the form
of Russia. Moscow has been trying to limit the integration between Eastern
Euro pean countries and the EU, seeing it as competing against its own influence.
To implement its strategy, Russia has employed such measures as economic
pressure, supporting separatism (especially in Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia and
Transnistria) and authoritarian political forces (for example, it supports the
Belarusian regime). 
The EU has heightened its activities with regard to Eastern Europe since 2004.
Bilateral contacts have been intensified and multilateral institutions for co-ope -
ration have been established. The EU has also shown greater engagement in cri-
tical situations in the region (for example, a post-conflict monitoring mission was
sent for the first time to an Eastern neighbourhood country). New financial in -
struments have been created which enable assistance to be offered in more varied
forms, including direct budgetary support and reinforcement of individual state
institutions. The value of funds allocated for both financial assistance and prefe -
rential loans (for example, from the EIB) has been raised. 
However, such activities have led primarily to the development of a network of
mu tual contacts and mechanisms for policy implementation. Some of these acti -
vities were preventive as they did not allow conflicts to escalate and inhibit ed
authoritarian tendencies in the region. 
Nevertheless, the actual integration process has been very limited. Most of the
goals set as part of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements currently in
force – and the Action Plans developed on the basis of those agreements – re -
main unfulfilled. Although work on Association Agreements commenced (with
all countries except Belarus), and negotiations regarding the Deep and Compre -
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with Ukraine are on track, problems appeared
right from the beginning. Negotiations with Kyiv have been in place for almost
three years now, and no end date has been determined as yet. Meanwhile, after
an Association Agreement is signed it must still be ratified by all member states.
The slow progress on integration was due to a number of factors, many of which
were not linked to EU policy. However, one can point to three problems within
this policy which have undoubtedly reduced the effectiveness of the EU’s actions. 
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1. The strategic deficit and de-Europeanisation of policy
The EU has been unable to answer the question regarding the membership
prospects of Eastern European countries or to determine clearly the goal which
an integration not involving membership should seek. This gave rise to a policy
of evasion, where the key strategic issues were either not mentioned or formu lat -
ed in a very complicated and vague manner. This made EU policy incomprehen -
sible to both member and partner states, and also undoubtedly had a demoti-
vating effect on both parties. The fear of the Eastern neighbours’ membership
aspirations also resulted in the de-Europeanisation of the policy towards East -
ern Europe. Clear statements as to whether three countries from this re gion
were part of the old continent and references to the idea of a united Europe were
avoided in EU documents. This inhibited the potential provided by virtue of their
European identity. In this manner the EU deprived itself of an important element
potentially capable of generating political will in the integration process. 
2. The limited offer and ambivalent perceptions as regards integration
The policy of integration with Eastern European countries was being implement -
ed in conditions where the measures applied to date had been significantly re -
stricted. First of all, the lack of membership prospects entailed both a significant
reduction of financial support and an inability to make full use of the conditio -
na lity mechanisms. However, the limitations went far beyond this issue. The EU
very quickly withdrew from its initially stated readiness to share ‘everything
apart from the institutions.’ The documents regarding policy towards Eastern
Europe provided for selective integration separate from membership. The scope
of potential exclusions was not precisely determined. The lack of readiness to
for mulate a more attractive offer stemmed from an ambivalent approach, visible
at the beginning and gaining in strength over recent years: while seeking to
draw Eastern European countries closer to it, the EU was at the same time tak-
ing a defensive approach in an attempt to prevent opening itself up to neigh-
bour countries. It is worth noting that the EU was resisting precisely those areas
where a move towards the EU was seen as especially beneficial by most partner
states (for example, the introduction of a visa-free regime, access to the agricul -
tural market, etc.). 
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3. Unresolved dilemmas: democracy or stabilisation; 
policy towards Russia
The EU, in the context of promoting its values, was unable to resolve the dilem-
ma of whether it should condemn authoritarian tendencies and support grass-
roots democratic movements or rather choose stability and economic benefits
resulting from trade co-operation with Eastern European governments (regard-
less of their attitude to democracy). The inability to resolve this problem was
especially evident in the case of Belarus, with regard to which the more busi-
ness-oriented and pro-democracy options were chosen interchangeably, and no
decisive actions were taken in either direction. The attempt to reconcile the prio -
rity for democratisation with the business-oriented and stabilisation goals also
led to a blurring of the criteria applied as part of the diversification policy.
Initially, it was intended to provide a more generous offer to those neighbour
countries which had made greater integration progress. In practice, the more ad -
van ced forms of co-operation were always offered in the first instance to Ukraine
(the biggest partner in the region), and relations with Azerbaijan (a country rich
in raw materials) were much better than with Belarus, which has a similarly
autho ritarian regime. 
The EU also was unable to resolve the dilemmas linked to Russian policy to -
wards Eastern Europe, which in many areas opposed the goals and actions taken
by Brussels. If this issue were raised explicitly, it would entail a confrontation with
Russia, for which the EU is un prepared. At the same time, turning a blind eye
to Mos cow’s actions undermin ed the credibility of the EU and its policy. In an
attempt to save face and at the same time avoid an overly costly confrontation
with Russia, the EU was on the one hand sending discreet signals of dissatisfa -
ction (at the time of the Orange Revolution or the Russia-Georgia war), and on
the other hand was minimising its activity in potentially contentious areas (for
example, issues linked to separatism).
The EU has been trying to compensate for a deficiency of genuine integration
with its Eastern neighbours by making progress in procedural and institution-
al areas (creating Action Plans, launching negotiations regarding Association
Agreements, establishing multilateral institutions as part of the Eastern Partner -
ship, and granting Action Plans for establishing a visa-free regime to Ukraine
and Moldova). These new institutional solutions are obviously necessary for
the implementation of the ENP goals in the East. However, the risk is that the
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Agreements and the Action Plans will become an objective per se and instead of
supporting integration they will be merely imitating the process. The dyna mics
of relations between the EU and Eastern Europe since 2004 makes this scenario
seem increasingly likely. 
Avoidance of this scenario is not entirely dependent on the EU. The actions taken
by the partner states are equally important, if not more so. However, since this
text concerns EU policy, the recommendations are made in reference to this. The
following actions appear to be of key significance for supporting genuine inte-
gration: 
Formulating a clear and attractive strategic message referring to the idea
of a united Europe. Contrary to broadly voiced concerns, this is possible with-
out making a clear offer of membership. 
Taking the risk of applying a more decisive policy of diversification. On the
one hand this would mean giving up (or slowing down, in the case where pre-
vious measures cannot be rescinded) those actions aimed at creating new in stru-
ments which produce no added value (for example, Association Agreements with
countries which are not interested in integration and treat the EU as an ordina ry
partner, or the development of an excessive number of multilateral bodies).
On the other hand, those countries which are interested in integration should be
encouraged through: (1) applying the available policies and instruments as soon
as possible (at present, starting DCFTA negotiations with Moldova and Georgia
and granting the latter country an Action Plan for a visa-free regime are of key
significance); (2) admitting that, as modernisation progress is made, the EU will
open up the agricultural sector to them, introduce the free movement of peo-
ple and undertake the process of building privileged institutional relations. 
A broader opening of the EU to Eastern European societies by providing
them with better access to EU programmes and offering more efficient sup-
port to civil organisations. 
This kind of support requires not only money but also adequate measures aim -
ed at developing self-reliance instead of dependence. It would be reasonable to
create a financial facility designed specifically to support civic society organisa -
tions (which inter alia would make it possible for the EU to award small grants
for the grassroots activities). 
It seems unreasonable to prematurely declare a more intensive engagement
than is presently the case in an area of so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ (which many
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experts have recently encouraged). The EU is still lacking the measures and
political will necessary to confront Russia in this field. Given this situation, any
attempts at intensifying the EU’s security policy are doomed to failure and may
only undermine the European Community’s credibility. 
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Part I. Eastern neighbourhood – how far 
from the European Union? 
Geographically, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova are situated on the European
Union’s doorstep and share (as do the Western Balkans) a common land border
with six EU member states. The Southern Caucasus is much more distant. Geor -
gia is the only country from this region to share a border (maritime in the Black
Sea) with the EU. The other two are merely neighbours of Georgia. From the
perspective of the goal of moving closer to the EU’, geography obviously is
important but only partly determines the disparities between these countries
and the European Union. What is much more significant are disparities n poli-
tics (model of governance and the values inherent in it), the economy (the gap
in prosperity levels) and identity (the status granted to the EU in the minds of
the elite and the public). The factor of utmost importance, on which possibili-
ties of development in all of the aforementioned areas depend, is the level of
stability. Drawing closer to the EU is a process which requires long-term action.
Meanwhile, dramatic and unpredictable crises may momentarily scupper tenu-
ous integration efforts which have been underway for many years. 
1. The political mosaic
The view that political systems in Eastern Europe are moving further away
from EU standards is predominant among experts and politicians. However,
when evaluating this aspect, one should consider it from a long-term perspec-
tive and also refrain from seeing changes in political systems only in terms of
the degree to which a given country can be said to be democratic or authori-
tarian. Political systems vary across Eastern Europe and have different histori-
cal and cultural origins, thus offering totally different prospects for establish-
ing closer integration with the EU. 
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Summing up, it can be said that the political systems of the Eastern neighbours
are not moving closer to the EU model. It would, however, be an oversimplifi-
cation to state that they are regularly departing from it. There are two coun-
tries (very different from each other) in Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan and Belarus,
whose models of governance have nothing to do with EU standards. In the case
of Azerbaijan, the situation appears to be fixed. In the case of Belarus, changes
are likely but the direction they will take is difficult to predict at the moment.
In the other countries, the changes in the system are characterised by an alter-
nation between less and more democratic phases and at the same time having
very durable institutional mechanisms, which are far from EU democratic stan-
dards. All countries defined as the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU, regardless
of the political system operating there, appear to be stable and efficient enough
not to pose the risk of plunging themselves into institutional chaos, which could
generate destabilisation and threat around them (for example through mass
migrations). 
2. The prosperity gap
Eastern Europe is definitely the poorest part of Europe. The prosperity gap be -
tween those countries and the EU is much wider than in the case of the Balkan
countries and absolutely incomparable to Central Europe’s situation in the 1990s.
The GDP per capita of the EU’s most important partner in the Eastern neigh-
bourhood, Ukraine, is five times lower than the average level of the EU. Ukraine
is, however, in a much better situation than the poorest country in this region,
Moldova, whose GDP per capita is equivalent to 9% of the average level of the EU.
At the same time, it is definitely good news that the GDP values in all the East -
ern neighbourhood countries have moved closer to the EU level over the past
15 years. However, the tempo of reducing this gap has varied from country to
country. Paradoxically, the countries which have achieved the greatest success
in this area are Azerbaijan and Belarus, the two countries in the region which
are most distant from the EU in terms of their political system. Belarus has
been the absolute champion in catching up with the EU average level, even
when compared to Central European countries, which have been developing at
the fastest rate. While Azerbaijan’s rise in prosperity has had obvious sources
and has been linked to the rapid development of the energy sector at the time
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EU (27) GDP PPP
per capita (US$) 
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
Macedonia
Croatia
Albania
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Montenegro
Serbia
Poland
Hungary
Slovakia
Latvia
1995
100
(17,617.132)
7
9
19
8
7
18
29
48
15
-
-
-
41
51
50
29
GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita in neighbour countries 
and in selected new member states in comparison to the EU 27 (100%)*
2000
100
(21,949.57)
9
11
23
10
7
15
28
50
17
20
-
26
47
55
51
35
2004
100
(25,490.167)
13
14
28
13
8
21
27
55
20
22
29
30
50
62
57
45
2008
100
(30,742.790)
19
28
40
16
10
24
30
60
23
25
36
35
57
64
72
56
2009
100
(29,729.287)
17
32
43
16
9
21
31
60
24
25
35
36
61
62
71
48
Balance
+10 
+23 
+24 
+8   
+2   
+3    
+2    
+12  
+9    
+5    
+6
+10  
+20  
+11  
+21  
+19  
Source: Author’s own calculations on the basis of GDP (PPP) per capita stated by the IMF 
in the World Economic Outlook 2010
*The same indicators calculated on the basis of Eurostat’s data are several percentage points
higher in the case of most of those countries. Additionally, it has to be taken into account 
that the grey market is very large in Eastern neighbourhood countries, especially in Armenia,
Moldova and Ukraine. 
of a boom on the raw material market (the Azeri economy is based on this sec-
tor), the case with Belarus is not so clear. Belarus’s impressive growth is partly
an effect of its being sponsored by Russia in exchange for political concessions.
Cheap raw materials, used for the production of fuel and artificial fertilisers,
have generated a major part of Belarusian foreign currency revenues. Bela ru sian
goods have been traded on the Russian market on preferential conditions, which
also has greatly contributed to the development of Belarusian economy. Thus,
the impressive economic growth is to a significant extent artificial and is likely
to slow down as the politically motivated support from Russia is reduced. How -
ever, regardless of the foundations and durability of economic convergence to
the EU average, the most rapidly developing countries in this region are at the
same time the least engaged partners as part of the ENP. In turn, the countries
which are seen as the ENP’s leaders in the East may deem the past fifteen years
as a time of wasted opportunities from the point of view of lessening the eco-
nomic gap between them and the European Union. Ukraine’s and Moldova’s
GDP per capita has increased since 1995 in comparison to the average level of
the EU by merely 2–3%. 
3. The weakness of economic bonds
Trade exchange between the EU and Eastern European countries is less inten-
sive than their potential allows. In 2009, the 72 million residents of the Eastern
neighbourhood consumed only 2.1% of EU exports, while 2.4% of EU exports
were sent to the Balkan countries, which have a total population of 27 million2.
Some EU member states (Germany and Central Europe) have slightly stronger
trade bonds with the Eastern neighbours. However, even for those states, trade
with Eastern Europe, not to mention the Southern Caucasus, is of minor signi -
fi cance (for example, in 2009, exports to Ukraine accounted for 2.6% of Poland’s
total exports).3 Trade exchange between the European Union and Eastern Eu -
rope is certainly asymmetrical. The EU is a much more important partner for
East ern Europe. However, Eastern European exports are not oriented towards
the EU markets so much as could be expected, especially considering their geo-
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2 Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat data.
3 Data from the Polish Central Statistical Office.
graphical location. They do not reach, even approximately, the levels of exports
from the Western Balkans or new member states (for example, in 2009, Croatia
sent 61%4 of its exports to the EU, and Poland 79%5). 
The EU is only the most important outlet for three out of the six countries from
this region. The European Community’s main partner in the Eastern neighbour -
hood, Ukraine, sells three quarters of its exports to non-EU member states. This
situation is similar to Georgia’s. The dynamics of exports from Eastern Europe
to the EU are symptomatic. The share of exports to the EU has increased signi -
ficantly over the past few years only for Moldova and Georgia. In the other coun -
tries of this region, the proportion of exports to the EU remained more or less
at the same level until 2008 and has significantly fallen since then. This fall indi -
cates that other trade partners have become relatively more significant than
the EU as a consequence of the crisis in this region. 
The energy sector is given key significance in the economic relations between
the EU and Eastern Europe. Azerbaijan is an exporter of hydrocarbons (however,
its supplies to the EU are at present very small). All countries from this region,
excepting Armenia, are transit states for raw materials imported by the EU. The
largest quantities of oil and gas are supplied to the EU via Belarus and Ukraine.
Raw materials sent by this route are especially vital for Germany and Central Eu -
ropean countries. However, this route will become less important when Baltic
Pipeline System-2 and Nord Stream are launched according to plans at the end
O S W  S t u d i e s
P
a
rt
 I
. 
H
o
w
 f
a
r 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e
 E
U
?
21
4 Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat data.
5 Data from the Polish Central Statistical Office.
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
2005
46.7
54.2
44.7
25.4
38.7
30.2
2006
48.2
56.9
46.3
26.3
47.3
28.7
2007
48.8
28.6
43.9
34.1
51.6
29.9
2008
53.9
57.7
43.6
22.5
48.8
27.4
2009
44.6
48.3
38.9
33.6
50.6
24.0
Share of exports to the EU27 in the exports from Eastern Partnership countries (%)
Source: Eurostat data http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/
of 2011 (both investments are aimed at increasing exports of Russian raw mate-
rials directly from Russian territory via the Baltic Sea to the EU). 
In turn, the volumes of transit to the EU via Azerbaijan (Kazakh oil) and Georgia
(Azeri gas and Azeri and Kazakh oil) are still tiny. The prospects for developing
this route are quite uncertain, given the slow progress in the implementation
of the EU’s ‘Southern Transport Corridor’ project, which was planned for use in
supplying fuel from the Caspian Sea Region to the EU via the Southern Cauca -
sus and Turkey. Therefore, it can be stated that in the case of the energy sector
the currently existing ties between the EU and Eastern Europe will be weakening,
while prospects for developing new elements of co-operation are very uncertain. 
4. The EU – partner or development model?
The perception of the European Union varies strongly in individual Eastern Euro-
pean countries at the level of both the government and public opinion. In this
aspect the situation in the region is very much unlike Central Europe at the be -
gin ning of the 1990s, with its total determination to integrate with the Euro -
pean Community at any price. 
The ruling class’s attitude to the EU in Eastern neighbourhood countries de -
pends primarily on the two issues: their stance on membership prospects and
the extent to which they see the EU as a social, economic and political model
worth copying. Based on official statements and actions taken by the govern-
ments, the situation of the Eastern partners in those two dimensions can be
presented in the following way: 
O S W  S t u d i e s
P
a
rt
 I
. 
H
o
w
 f
a
r 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e
 E
U
?
22
Over the past six years (since the launch of the European Neighbourhood Po -
licy) this stance has remained principally unchanged in all Eastern neighbour-
hood countries, except for Moldova, which has taken a more pro-EU approach
since the 2009 election. At present, no Eastern European government is conduct-
ing an offensive aimed at being given a membership perspective. This is how-
ever an effect of the correct intuition that such initiatives have no chance of suc-
cess. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian and Moldovan elites share the opinion that
such a perspective should be opened up to those two countries. Georgia for-
mulates similar expectations, albeit less confidently, being aware that the geo-
graphical distance poses an additional impediment to such aspirations. Expecta -
tions regarding membership perspective do not always go hand in hand with
the belief that the EU is the only civilisational model which has no alternatives.
This determined stance is presently represented by the government of Moldova
and to a slightly lesser extent by the government of Georgia (part of the ruling
class believe that their country should follow the ultraliberal path). The Ukrai -
nian political elite demonstrates an even more reserved and selective approach.
Kyiv currently sees the EU as one of the possible development models, which
should be copied selectively (especially given the lack of membership perspec-
tives) depending on the pragmatic interests of Ukraine. The other three Eastern
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neighbours at present neither formulate any expectations with regard to mem-
bership perspectives, nor see the EU as the main development model. The Arme -
nian government perceives the EU as a source of partial modernisation. In turn,
for the leaders of Azerbaijan and Belarus, the EU is mainly a trade partner and
a political actor which offers an economic and political counterbalance to Russia.
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Country
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Georgia
Moldova
Ukraine
for
64%
32.2%
60.9%
–
–
65.1%
against
11.8%
*
10.9%
–
–
12.9%
for
81%
–
36.4%
79%
61.4%
53%
against
11%
–
39.4%
2%
17.7%
25%
Support for integration with the European Union in Eastern Neighbourhood countries
Questions and sources: 
Armenia: 1) Do you support Armenia’s accession to the European Union? December 2004
http://www.acnis.am/pr/agenda/Socio10eng.pdf
2) In your opinion, should Armenia join the European Union in the future? January 2008
http://www.iri.org/explore-our-resources/public-opinion-research/public-opinion-polls
Azerbaijan: Which direction of binding co-operation and integration closer together is in your opinion 
the most beneficial for Azerbaijan? January 2010 http://www.regnum.ru/news/1279723.html
* responses to the other questions: 41.7% – Azerbaijan should remain an independent state and co-operate
with all countries; 14.8% – for integration with the CIS; 7.7% – for integration with the Organisation 
of the Islamic Conference 
Belarus: 1) Do you think that Belarus should become a member state of the European Union? December 2002
http://n-europe.eu/content/index.php?p=3289
2) If a referendum were held in Belarus today to decide whether Belarus should or should not join 
the European Union, how would you vote? June 2010. http://www.iiseps.org/press10.html
Georgia: How would you vote in a referendum regarding Georgia’s accession to the European Union?
October 2009 http://www.epfound.org/index.php?article_id=106
Moldova: How would you vote in a referendum regarding Moldova’s accession to the European Union? 
May 2010 http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=en&idc=156&id=552&parent=0
Ukraine: 1) Should Ukraine join the European Union? November 2002 
http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=387
2) Should Ukraine join the European Union? April 2010
http://www.gfk.ua/public_relations/press/press_articles/005859/index.ua.html
2002–2004 2008–2010
The government’s policy in most cases corresponds to the preferences of the
public in a given country. This is the case with Moldova and Georgia, where pro-
integration sentiments dominate, and with Belarus, where Eurosceptic views are
prevalent. This is also true to some extent in the case of Ukraine, where am -
bivalence in the stances can be observed: a greater part of the public support
integration; however there is also a large share of the public which opposes it.
The strongest dissonance between the government and public opinion is present
in Armenia, where citizens support integration with the EU much more strongly
than is expressed in the policy of their government. However, in general, the
potential for public support for integration is high across the Eastern neigh-
bourhood: most people in four of the five Eastern European countries, where
surveys were conducted, believe that integration with the EU is an attractive
direction for their country’s development. 
5. The constructive and the destructive instability 
Crisis situations in the East have taken a great variety of forms over the past
decade and should absolutely not be seen altogether as a measure of the re -
gion’s instability. First of all, we should distinguish the crises which developed
from the desire (of the opposition or citizens) to undermine the legitimacy of
authoritarian practices used by the ruling class. As many as five such major
events (which usually took the form of large-scale post-election public protests)
took place in Eastern Europe over the past decade: in 2003 in Georgia, in 2004
in Ukraine, in 2006 in Belarus, in 2008 in Armenia and in 2009 in Moldova.
These protests caused a clear democratisation of the political system and a re -
orientation of the government’s policy towards a pro-European and pro-reform
direction in two countries, Georgia and Moldova, and helped prevent the rein-
forcement and entrenchment of the authoritarian regime in one case, Ukraine.
The status quo was preserved in all other cases. Such crises undoubtedly prov ed
the weakness and instability of those states. However, at the same time, they
were the most effective way of reversing anti-democratic trends in the region.
They also revealed that the countries had such strong institutions that even
very serious political turmoil did not lead to chaos and a collapse of the institu -
tional order.
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The regularly recurring disputes over oil and gas supplies between Russia as
one side and Ukraine or Belarus as the other are another kind of crisis situation.
As an effect of such conflicts, fuel supplies from Russia to Western Europe have
been reduced or cut as many as six times since 20046. These crises caused prob-
lems to several EU member states, without however adversely affecting the eco -
nomy of the European Union as a whole. Their main consequence was to under-
mine the certainty about the stability and reliability of Russian raw material
supplies via the territories of Eastern European countries. The main cause of
the ‘energy wars’ were non-transparent business relations between Russia and
Eastern European countries, involving corruption schemes. This was also coupled
with the Russian practice of using oil and gas as tools in Moscow’s political
game. 
One of the most important and most difficult issues which is adversely affect-
ing stability in the region is separatism and the quasi-states which have emer -
g ed in effect of it. These are Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which formally belong
to Georgia but practically are heavily dependent on Russia), Transnistria (a part
of Moldova de iure) and Nagorno-Karabakh (formally belonging to Azerbaijan
and in fact controlled by Armenia). In the latter two cases, the situation has re -
mained almost unchanged since the early 1990s. Meanwhile the conflict over
South Ossetia, which received support from Russia, became intensified in 2009.
This gave rise to a five-day war between Russia and Georgia (in legal terms, the
two countries are still at war because no peace accord has been signed as yet).
As a result of the war, Moscow recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia as inde-
pendent states. No prospects for resolving the disputes can be seen in any of
the four cases. The separatisms are potential flashpoints. However, their nega-
tive impact extends far beyond the military threat. They are weakening their
mother states (Moldova, Georgia) and those involved in conflicts (Armenia),
thus strengthening corruption and illegal business in those countries and are
also contributing to keeping the tension and even hatred between individual
countries (Georgia-Russia and Armenia-Azerbaijan). The existence of quasi-states
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6 February 2004 – gas supplies sent via Belarus cut for more than ten hours; 1-4 January 2006 – gas
supplies via Ukraine withheld; 7-10 January 2007 – oil supplies via Belarus withheld; March 2008 –
gas supplies via Ukraine were limited for two days; gas supplies via Ukraine cut between 1 and 20
January 2009, gas supplies via Belarus limited between 21 and 24 June 2010.
significantly reduces the room for manoeuvre for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Moldova primarily in the international community, for example by impeding
them in their potential efforts to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic structures. 
All the para-states are operating to some extent owing to support from Moscow.
This is especially true with South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria7. In effect,
the Russian Federation has immense possibilities for shaping the situation
around these conflicts. This potential is used by Russia to maintain its influence
across Eastern Europe and restrict those elements of co-operation with the
West which are seen as contrary to Moscow’s interests. 
6. Conclusion: Europe is still divided
Eastern Europe’s closer integration with the EU is one of the toughest integra-
tion challenges the European Community has faced. This is the poorest region
of Europe, where none of the countries meet EU standards regarding political
systems to various extents. The past decade has shown that achievements in
the area of civil freedoms and the rule of law in those countries may even re -
gress in a few years. At the same time, this is a strongly diversified region; the
gaps between individual Eastern European countries and the EU are very diffe -
rent. Moreover, political similarity does not entail economic similarity. The three
Eastern neighbours which are closest to the EU in political terms include the
two poorest countries of the region and the two which have the weakest eco-
nomic bonds with the EU (if the criterion is the share of their exports which go
to the EU market). Additionally, a significant part of the Eastern European elite is
lacking a clear determination to treat the EU as an optimal civilisational model. 
However, Eastern Europe in some areas has unique potential in comparison to
other neighbours of the EU. Eastern European countries are sufficiently effec-
tive and predictable so they appear unlikely to become sources of crises which
could pose a serious threat to the European Union’s security. Paradoxically, the
main factor which may potentially destabilise the region is external and is link ed
to the policy Russia applies to separatisms existing in this area. Eastern Euro -
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7 1,500 Russian soldiers are stationed in Transnistria and 400 in the security zone as part of the
Russian-Moldovan-Transnistrian peacekeeping forces. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have approx-
imately 1,700 Russian soldiers stationed there. 
pean countries also have significant potential for grassroots democracy: over
the past decade, mass protests against election fixing took place in each of the
countries at least once, some of which ended in blocking attempts at entrench-
ing authoritarian practices. Integration with the EU has great public support in
most countries in the region. Most of these countries, despite the lack of clear
membership perspectives, feel they have the right to expect that the door to
the European Community should remain open to them. 
O S W  S t u d i e s
P
a
rt
 I
. 
H
o
w
 f
a
r 
fr
o
m
 t
h
e
 E
U
?
28
Part II. The Eastern vector of the neighbourhood policy 
1. The institutional evolution from the European Neighbourhood
Policy to the Eastern Partnership 
The European Union’s policy towards Eastern Europe has evolved significantly
over the past two decades. In the 1990s, the perception of this region as a post-
Soviet area was prevalent in the European Community: it was seen mainly as
the periphery of the former empire at the core of which was Russia. At the be -
ginning of this century, when it became clear that the EU and the European
post-Soviet countries would inevitably share common borders, the European
Community’s outlook on Eastern Europe started changing. It was seen more
and more often as a future Eastern neighbourhood of the EU. Then the issue of
offering membership perspectives to countries such as Ukraine or Moldova was
seriously raised for the first time. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
was initiated in 2004, when seven Central European states joined the EU. The
ENP de facto drew a distinction in the EU policy between Eastern European
countries and the rest of the post-Soviet area, thus sealing their special status
as EU neighbours. However, at the same time, the European nature of the East -
ern neighbourhood was blurred since these countries were lumped together
with the EU’s overseas neighbours (eleven countries from North African and
the Middle East). Two years after the enlargement a debate on strengthening
the ENP commenced (the European Commission published two communica-
tions regarding this matter in 2006 and 2008, the issue of ENP+ was also raised
twice in the European Council’s conclusions). In effect, new elements of secto -
ral co-operation were added to the policy and a decision to start negotiating
(initially only with Ukraine) a new framework agreement which was to include
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. Another significant stage in the
ENP’s evolution was the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative in
2009, which was proposed and promoted by Sweden and Poland. One of the
things this initiative was the first to introduce were durable instruments of
multilateral co-operation. 
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2. The (non-) strategic vision, or Where is the ENP heading? 
The key issue in the debate on the EU’s policy towards Eastern Europe was the
strategic goal it would be heading for. Granting membership perspectives to
the new neighbours raised serious doubts in most EU member states from the
very beginning. At the same time, ruling out this possibility explicitly would
undermine the European Union’s credibility as this would be contrary to arti-
cle 49 of the Treaty on the European Union, which provides that each European
country which has met certain conditions has the right to apply for member-
ship of the European Union. For this reason attempts were made to determine
goals which would extend beyond ordinary co-operation but would not mean
pursuit of membership. The most precise proposal was formulated by the then
president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, who said: “a proximity
policy does not need to start from a promise of membership but it should not
rule it out.” Its goal can be ‘sharing everything but institutions’: the common
market, free trade and also common way of dealing with threats (for example,
taking actions aimed at ending conflicts in Europe)8. Similar, if slightly more
cautious, proposals were put forward in the Communication from the European
Commission ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’ (11 March 2003). It provided that
the “New Independent States (NIS) should be offered the prospect of a stake in
the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote
the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms).”
The communication mentions article 49 and at the same time indicates that al -
though a further enlargement of the EU Eastwards requires a debate, this issue
is still open to all interested European countries. 
Finally, the goals of the policy towards Eastern neighbours were presented in
the ENP Strategy Paper, which was published in May 2004 and was later ap -
proved by the Council. It stated that the new policy “offers a means to reinforce
relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the pos-
sibilities available to European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty on Euro -
pean Union.” One of the goals of the ENP is “moving beyond co-operation to
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8 Romano Prodi President of the European Commission: A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the
key to stability “Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU” Sixth
ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, 5-6 December 2002.
a significant degree of integration, including through a stake for partner coun-
tries in the EU’s Internal Market.” 
Thus the solutions adopted were much more cautious than those proposed dur-
ing the debate. The document lacked any (whether positive or negative) refer-
ences to membership perspectives for Eastern European countries. This possi-
bility was neither ruled out nor confirmed. The “significant degree of integra-
tion” goal set in the document assumed that the process would be selective
(thus diverging from the idea of ‘sharing everything but institutions’) but it did
not determine the scope of such integration. Consequently, the ENP not only
avoided addressing the question about membership but also its goals were for-
mulated in such an unclear way so as to safeguard the EU even from any exces-
sive integration commitments to its Eastern neighbours not involving mem-
bership. 
The goals of Eastern Partnership, an initiative adopted in 2009 to reinforce the
Eastern dimension of the ENP, were formulated in an equally unclear way. The
conclusions of the European Council as of 20 March 2009 presenting the guide-
lines of the EaP include the following statement9: “The Eastern Partnership will
bring about a significant strengthening of EU policy with regard to its Eastern
partners by seeking to create the necessary conditions for political association
and further economic integration between the European Union and its Eastern
partners. The Eastern Partnership will also help to build trust and develop clos-
er ties among the six Eastern partners themselves.” 
It is also worth noting that in all the concept documents much more attention
is focused on the significance of the policy for the six Eastern European coun-
tries than on the benefits for the EU itself. The latter are principally reduced to
the statement (in both the ENP and the EaP) that establishing closer relations
with the EU contributes to promoting stability, prosperity and good governan ce
in the neighbouring countries, which is important for the European Union.
Such an ‘altruistic’ formulation of the goals seems to intentionally dim another
key aspect of the neighbourhood policy, namely increasing the scope of the appli -
cation of EU standards, which entails building up the European Community’s
potential as a player on the international arena. 
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9 http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_8584_fr.htm
3. The first treaty cycle – Partnership and Co-operation
Agreements
The core of EU policy towards its Eastern neighbours consists of the two-stage
cycle focused on bilateral agreements: (1) the strenuous and extremely long-last ing
process of negotiating and ratifying them, (2) followed by their implementa-
tion. It took almost ten years to develop the first agreement of this kind, which
was completed in the late 1990s. That process fitted in with the regional strat-
egy. The same type of agreements, the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements
(PCA), were signed with all post-Soviet countries, except for the Baltic states
and Be la rus10. The PCA first of all set the rules of economic co-operation (includ-
ing access to markets, the transit of goods, etc.). They provided for drawing
closer to EU standards in several areas (however, a failure to implement those
provisions did not entail any consequences). Those agreements were also used
as a legal base for the establishment of institutions for bilateral co-operation
between the EU and individual countries from this region. These include annu-
al Co-operation Councils (ministers from the partner states and the EU Troika),
a Co-operation Committee at the level of senior officials and subcommittees
dealing with issues from particular sectors (for example, trade and investment,
customs, cross-border co-operation, justice and internal affairs, etc.). An annual
summit is also held in the case of Ukraine11. Initially, the ENP was strictly a polit-
ical initiative, bearing no legal or institutional implications. The Action Plans
introduced and sign ed as part of it until 2005 were purely political documents
and were intended to support the implementation of PCA provisions aimed at
the adoption of EU standards by the partner states. 
A breakthrough came with the decision to start negotiating Association Agree -
ments (AA). This was taken during a debate on the reinforcement of the ENP.
It marked the beginning of another cycle linked to bilateral agreements which
has not moved further than the negotiation phase at that point. The decision
to develop new agreements was made mainly because both the EU and the East -
ern European countries needed to demonstrate a movement forward to a new,
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10 The agreement with Turkmenistan was signed but still has not been ratified. 
11 The EU was represented at the 2010 summit by the president of the European Commission, the
president of the Council and the European Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neigh bour-
hood Policy.
more advanced stage of relations. To a much lesser extent it was an effect of the
real implementation of the previous agreements. Most of the goals set under
the PCA and specified in the Action Plans had not been achieved. 
4. The second treaty cycle: Association Agreements 
and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
The Association Agreements (AA) are unlikely to bring anything new as regards
the strategic offer and membership prospects for the signatory states. The part
devoted to the establishment of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
(DCFTA) has the greatest added value and is the most important new element
in comparison to the PCA. The other parts of the Association Agreements cover:
(1) political dialogue in the area of foreign and security policy, (2) justice and
home affairs, and (3) economic and sectoral co-operation. However, the DCFTA
is to be negotiated only with those Eastern neighbours which are ready for this
(i.e. those which are members of the WTO and have met certain preconditions
determined by the EU). The Association Agreements, and especially their part
regarding the DCFTA, are much more compulsory in their nature for the part-
ner states than the PCA. Certain elements of the EU market can be opened up
to a given country on condition that the country has adopted the relevant reg-
ulations applicable in the EU. Some issues, in case of breach of any obligations
agreed by the parties, can be handled by the application of the dispute solving
mechanism. The next instance may even see them referred to the Court of Jus -
tice of the European Union. Although such solutions do not guarantee that all
provisions of the new agreement will be implemented, they still offer a greater
chance for the AA to become a more effective instrument for drawing the
Eastern neighbours closer to the EU than the Partnership Agreements which
are currently in force. 
The DCFTA is intended to be a project with a significantly broader scope than
a regular free trade area and is to lead to the elimination of non-tariff barriers
through the harmonisation of legislation and the adoption of similar standards.
The first and thus far the only DCFTA is being negotiated with Ukraine (nego-
tiations are planned also with Moldova and Georgia). The agreement provides
for a full liberalisation of trade exchange for 95-97% of goods (according to the
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tariff lines and export values as of 2005-2007). This agreement, given the body
of regulations and market access it provides for, may be more advanced than
the Europe Agreements, which were signed with Central European countries in
the 1990s. 
However, these theoretically mutually beneficial solutions have raised numer-
ous controversies and revealed conflicts of interest between the parties. These
have resurfaced during the DCFTA negotiations the EU and Ukraine have been
conducting since 2008. 
The EU limits access to its internal market in such sensitive areas as agricul-
tural and food products (the restrictions are imposed on 20% of products in this
group; although the DCFTA will facilitate access it will not bring about a total
opening up of this segment of the EU market) and some types of services . From
Ukraine’s point of view, these are precisely the areas which offer opportunities
for achieving significant benefits already in the short term. This belief is even
reinforced by the expectation that the DCFTA, given its nature (mainly raw ma -
terials and low-processed goods), will bring relatively low benefits to exports
already existing, on which quite small tariff and non-tariff barriers are imposed
anyway. 
Ukraine is also trying to protect its market and limit the scope of implementa-
tion of regulations in some areas which are important for the EU (such as the
full protection of geographic indicators, access to energy distribution related
services, the full abolition of tariffs on industrial products and the elimination
of export tariffs). This stance Ukraine is taking results from the following three
factors: 
(1) Given the modest aid from the EU and the weakness of the Ukrainian state,
the government in Kyiv fears that it could not fulfil its obligations before the
transition periods expire, which could lead to an asymmetrical opening up of
the markets to Ukraine’s disadvantage. (2) The Ukrainian government also assu -
mes that, given the lack of real membership perspectives (which means it will
not be able to influence the shape of EU regulations in the future), the cost and
risk entailed in the implementation of acquis communautaire on such a large scale
will be much higher than the expected advantages. (3) However, first of all, the
Ukrainian ruling class (and the business circles supporting it) do not want to
relinquish the existing protectionist solutions for the sake of long-term strate-
gic benefits and the risk of incurring the related economic and political costs. 
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The areas of disagreement outlined above have made the negotiations longer
than had been planned. Two years since the launch of the negotiations, the par-
ties are unable to determine when they will end. The problems which have
become evident during the negotiations with Ukraine seem to concern a broader
scope than the special character of EU-Ukraine relations and are very likely to
resurface also during DCFTA negotiations with other Eastern partners. 
5. Sectoral co-operation – a chance for a genuine rapprochement?
Aside from the PCA and the AA, sectoral co-operation is introduced for the pur-
pose of integration in the areas which are important for both parties. At pres-
ent this co-operation covers, for example, energy issues. The EU would like all
the Eastern neighbours to become members of the European Energy Commu -
nity (EEC), which would entail a partial adoption of EU standards in the organ-
isation of their energy sectors and in the transit of raw materials (EEC mem-
bers are obliged to guarantee the independence of the transport system oper-
ator from the producers and thus to ensure access to the transport infrastruc-
ture according to free competition principles). Other issues which either are
already being negotiated or may be negotiated in the future as part of sectoral
co-operation include: a coordination of transport policy and the Common Avia -
tion Area Agreement.The most important area covered by sectoral co-operation,
from the Eastern neighbours’ point of view, is the visa regime. Most neighbour
countries (especially Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) have declared great deter-
mination in their efforts to achieve the level of integration necessary to enable
the introduction of a visa-free regime (Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova have uni-
laterally lifted visa obligations on EU citizens). 
When the EU moved closer to the borders of the Eastern European countries,
this had an immediate adverse effect on them. The new member states as part
of the accession process had to cancel the visa-free regime, which had been in
force in the 1990s. However, the visa regimes introduced in the initial phase
were predominantly very flexible, which prevented a reduction in the cross-
border traffic. The real visa barrier appeared with the enlargement of the
Schengen Area in 2007, which inflicted the greatest losses upon the largest and
the closest Eastern neighbours of the EU, Belarus and Ukraine. 
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The new EU member states from Central Europe granted 40% less visas to citi -
zens of Eastern European countries in 2008 than in 2007: 50% less to Bela ru sians
and around 30% less to Ukrainians. The total number of visas granted was re -
duced by more than 600,000. More visas were granted in 2009, but their number
was significantly smaller than before the enlargement of the Schengen Area.
Initially, the EU visa policy with regard to its Eastern neighbours was focused
on minimising threats and paid less attention to the negative impact on cross-
border contacts. However, this approach evolved in the following years (one ex -
ample of this is the Communication from the European Commission on Streng -
thening the ENP of December 200612), which was reflected in concrete actions
taken by the EU. Four agreements establishing a more flexible visa regime with
Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Georgia came into effect by 2011. They simplified
the visa procedures for some categories of travellers (for example, students,
close relatives, athletes, members of official delegations, etc.), shortened the visa
granting procedure and reduced the cost of the visa (from 60 to 35 euros). The
latter solution was of key significance for citizens of those countries since the
other facilitations concerned relatively small groups of people. 
One of the long-term objectives of Eastern Partnership, which was initiated in
2009, is the total lifting of the visa requirement with regard to the countries
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1.1
1.9
3.3
+0.8
+2.1
Armenia
2.1
2.5
3.5
+0.2
+0.65
Azerbaijan
513.7
247.1
296.2
-0.52
-0.42
Belarus
10.6
15.5
13.7
+0.47
+0.3
Georgia
18.1
23.2
20.1
+0.28
+0.1
Moldova
980
625.5
668.3
-0.36
-0.32
Ukraine
1525
915.8
1005.2
-0.4
-0.34
Total
2007
2008
2009
Visas granted to citizens of Eastern Partnership countries by the consulates of Poland,
Slovakia, Czech Republic, Hungary and the Baltic states: quantity in thousands 
and change in comparison to 2007
Source: Documents of the Visa Working Party, General Secretariat of the Council
For 2008: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st08/st08215.en08.pdf
For 2009: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/09/st12/st12493.en09.pdf
For 2010: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st10/st10002-re01.en10.pdf
12 This document emphasised that the “length and cost of procedures for short-term visas is a highly
“visible” disincentive to partner countries, and an obstacle to many of the ENP’s underlying objec-
tives. (…)Whether for business purposes, for purposes of education or tourism, science and research,
for civil society conferences or even for official meetings at national or local government level, the
ability to obtain short-term visas in a reasonable time at a reasonable cost will be an indicator of the
strength of our European Neighbourhood Policy.”
covered by this initiative. However, the EU has been very cautious about this
issue so far. It took Kyiv a long time, much debating and many efforts to be pre-
sented in November 2010 with an Action Plan for visa-free movement (this so -
lution was less binding on Brussels than the road map Ukraine had requested).
The same kind of Action Plan was proposed to Moldova at the beginning of 2011.
This policy of the European Union is mainly an effect of very strong resistance
from many of its member states due to their fear of an upsurge in illegal immi-
gration from the East. 
6. Diversification: more for more?
As part of the EU policy with regard to its neighbours, including Eastern Eu -
rope, the offers addressed to particular countries are quite diversified. 
In Eastern Europe, Ukraine is the most advanced partner as part of the EU’s neigh -
bourhood policy. It was the first country to start negotiating the Deep and Com -
prehensive Free Trade Area agreement, it has signed a document implementing
the Association Agenda and is the most advanced in sectoral co-operation. At
the opposite end of the scale is Belarus, co-operation with which is based on
the Trade and Co-operation Agreement signed in 1989 with the Soviet Union. 
The general assumption is that the diversification of the policy towards Eastern
European partners should be a function of the engagement and potential of
individual Eastern European countries in the process of their integration with
the EU. However, in practice, an important part is also played by informal crite -
ria, among which the following may be distinguished: 
Geographical proximity. The countries which border the EU directly are given
higher priority than the overseas partners from the Southern Caucasus. How -
ever, at the same time, much stricter criteria in the area of human rights and
democracy are applied to the countries located in the close neighbourhood. The
geographical criterion appears to be the reason for the preferential treatment
of Moldova in comparison to Georgia (the negotiations regarding the Asso cia -
tion Agreement were launched earlier and the agreement establishing a more
flexible visa regime was signed) and on the other hand for adopting a more prin -
cipled stance with regard to Belarus than Azerbaijan. Although the two coun-
tries have similar problems in the area of democracy and human rights, this
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Country
Ukraine
Moldova
Belarus
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Treaty base
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
signed in 1994 came into effect in 1998.
The Association Agenda was signed in 2009.
The Association Agreement has been undergoing
negotiation since 2007.
DCFTA negotiations are in place since 2008.
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
signed in 1994 came into effect in 1998.
The Action Plan was signed in 2005.
The Association Agreement has been undergoing
negotiation since 2010.
DCFTA negotiations are expected to start in
2011 when the conditions set by the European
Commission are fulfilled. 
The Trade and Co-operation Agreement is in force.
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
signed in 1996 came into effect in 1999.
The Action Plan was signed in 2006.
The Association Agreement has been undergoing
negotiation since 2010.
A DCFTA feasibility study has been developed;
negotiations may start when the conditions set
by the European Commission are fulfilled. 
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
signed in 1996 came into effect in 1999.
The Action Plan was signed in 2006.
The Association Agreement has been undergoing
negotiation since 2010.
DCFTA negotiations are impossible without
WTO membership. 
The Partnership and Co-operation Agreement
signed in 1996 came into effect in 1999.
The Action Plan was signed in 2006.
The Association Agreement has been undergoing
negotiation since 2010.
A DCFTA feasibility study has been developed;
negotiations may start when the conditions set
by the European Commission are fulfilled. 
Sectoral co-operation
An agreement on visa facilitation was
signed. 
The Action Plan for visa-free movement
was put forward. 
An agreement on accession to the
European Energy Community was signed.
The Common Aviation Area Agreement
is being negotiated.
An agreement on visa facilitation was
signed.
An agreement on accession 
to the European Energy Community
was signed.
The Action Plan for a visa-free 
movement was put forward.
The agreement on visa facilitation 
was signed. 
The Common Aviation Area Agreement
was initialled.
The EU’s relations with individual Eastern European countries in 2010
issue does not impede relations with Baku but has been preventing co-opera-
tion with Belarus for many years. 
Regional standardisation. The EU wants in a way to standardise its policy with
regard to the entire region. This means that, despite the assumed diversification,
it avoids overly large differences at the level of its formal offer. This is probably
due to its unwillingness to make certain partners feel both excessively privileg ed
(which could lead to a demanding attitude towards Brussels) or unfairly under-
valued (which could cause frustration and enmity towards the EU). This is also
an expression of the EU’s desire to keep a bureaucratic order in the area of exter-
nal relations. This kind of approach was reflected, for example, in the simulta-
neous launch of negotiations regarding Association Agreements with all South -
ern Caucasian countries despite the vast differences in the levels of their enga -
gement (high in the case of Georgia and low in the case of Azerbaijan). 
The European Union’s interests with regard to individual countries. The level of
the EU’s engagement depends on the degree of significance a given partner has
for the EU. The fact that Azerbaijan is a major oil and gas producer in this re -
gion and an important transit country for the planned Nabucco gas pipeline
certainly makes the EU more inclined to turn a blind eye on the authoritarian
practices applied by this country’s regime. In turn, when dealing with Ukraine,
the EU is obviously guided by the calculation that both the challenges and the
potential benefits that contacts with this country of fifty million people may
bring are larger than in the case of the small Southern Caucasian states or Mol -
do va. Precisely this higher potential seems to be one of the main factors which,
regardless of the numerous problems and perturbation, determine Ukraine’s
status as the leader of the ENP’s Eastern direction. It is also symptomatic that
the DCFTA negotiations with Kyiv were commenced without setting any pre-
conditions, except for WTO membership, while Georgia and Moldova are expect-
ed for example to adopt EU regulations regarding sanitary and phytosanitary
standards as well as intellectual property rights. 
The existence of such informal criteria undermines the principle of greater offer
for greater achievements. This gives rise to accusations that the EU is using dou-
ble standards (for example with regard to Belarus and Azerbaijan) and reduces
the EU’s flexibility in terms of support for the most engaged partners (for exam-
ples, small countries located far from the EU, such as Georgia). This also makes
it difficult for Brussels when negotiating subsequent treaty agreements with
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the partners which are unable to absorb the new legal solutions (for example,
Azerbaijan and Armenia).
7. Multilateral co-operation
In the first years after enlargement, the European Union applied only bilateral
policy towards its Eastern neighbours. In 2007, the EU initiated a regional co-
operation project, the Black Sea Synergy. It was targeted at all the countries in
the Black Sea basin, in the broad meaning of the term, including Russia, Turkey
and the Eastern European states (excepting Belarus). The idea of establishing
regional co-operation along the Black Sea coast was partly a consequence of Ro -
mania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, which made Brussels more interest -
ed in this region. To minimise costs, no new institutions were established and
it was decided that the Black Sea Synergy would be operating on the basis of
an already existing Organization of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC). 
During the first years of its existence theis initiative was rather inactive. In or -
der to revive it, a concept appeared for establishing partnerships in three sec-
tors: ecology, transport and energy. The ecological partnership is the only one
to have been formally initiated so far (in March 2010). The partnerships are aim -
ed at implementing regional projects to facilitate attracting commercial funds
allowing for the implementation of greater infrastructural investments. 
Multilateral co-operation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours was insti-
tutionalised as late as 2009 as part of the implementation of the Eastern Part -
nership policy, one of the objectives of which, aside from reinforcing bilateral
co-operation, was to initiate multilateral co-operation between Eastern Euro -
pean countries and the EU27. This co-operation was organised on the basis of four
theme platforms. The platforms in turn may appoint expert panels to address
narrowly defined issues. The work of the platforms is summed up at an annual
summit at the ministerial level. Eastern Partnership summits are also held bien-
nially at the head of state level. Intergovernmental multilateral co-operation is
to be supplemented with co-operation at other levels: business, local govern-
ment, parliamentary and non-governmental. Multilateral flagship projects are
to ensure “concrete substance and more visibility to the Eastern Partnership
initiative”.
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Institutional framework
The EaP summit (biennial)
The ministerial meetings
ministers of foreign affairs (meet once a year
other ministerial formulas (depending on the needs)
The four thematic platforms (biannual meetings)
Democracy, good governance 
(including the anti-corruption panel and integrated 
border management
Economic integration and convergence with EU policies
Energy security
Contacts between people
The Flagship Initiatives
Integrated Border Management Programme 
(44.5 million euros)
Small and Medium-size Enterprise facility 
(57 million euros)
Regional energy markets and energy efficiency 
and renewable energy (41 million euros)
Environmental governance (12 million euros)
Prevention of, preparedness for and response to natural
and man-made disasters (12 million euros)
Diversification of energy supply 
(the Southern Energy Corridor)
Euronest Parliamentary Assembly
Assembly of Local and Regional Authorities
Civil Society Forum (the Forum meets once a year)
Business Council
Implementation
The first one took place in Prague in 2009  
The meetings of foreign ministers 
are held as planned
All the platforms meet 
according to schedule
All the flagship initiatives, with 
the exception of the project Diversification
of energy supply (the Southern Energy
Corridor), have been initiated 
but are at a very early stage at present.
The first session is scheduled 
for the first half of 2011 
with no delegation from Belarus.
Proposed
The first meeting of the Forum took 
place in November 2009 in Brussels, 
and the second was held in November
2010 in Berlin. The Steering Committee
of the Forum operates between 
the meetings of the Forum.
Proposed
Multilateral co-operation as part of the Eastern Partnership
The way the Eastern Partnership has been functioning so far proves that multi -
lateral co-operation with Eastern European countries has a totally different na -
ture than bilateral relations. Such co-operation broadens the channels for com-
munication and mutual dialogue, which is doubtless an advantage of it. How -
ever, at the same time, the decision-making process in all the multilateral bodies
is based on consensus, which de facto means reducing co-operation to the small -
est common denominator. This sometimes leads to situations contrary to EU
stan dards (for example, representatives of civil society have not been admitted
to participation in the Thematic Platforms due to objections from Belarus). This
also makes impossible to raise some issues, especially sensitive ones, and pre-
vents the application of any conditionality. Euronest is an example of an attempt
to apply conditionality. The European Parliament appealed for a limitation of the
participation of Belarusian MPs in this initiative because the elections in their
country had not been recognised by the EU. This met with sharp opposition
from President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, who not only blocked the creation of
Euronest but also became more critical of the Eastern Partnership as a whole. 
The organisation of structures which operate at the level of ministers, officials
and experts and which enable regular multilateral communication both within
the Eastern European region and between the partner countries and the EU mem-
ber states is an achievement of the Eastern Partnership which is undeniably
great. However, more than a year and a half since the beginning of the opera-
tion of these multilateral forums, increasingly strong doubts are appearing as
to the tasks they should be carrying out. According to the Declaration publish ed
after the first summit of the Eastern Partnership13, their objective is to “share
information and experience on the partner countries’ steps towards transition,
reform and modernisation. It will facilitate the development of common posi-
tions and joint activities.” In turn, the platforms themselves are to “adopt a set
of realistic, core objectives, with a corresponding work programme, and will
review the progress achieved.” In practice, these countries have too little in
common and differ too much in their respective approaches to system trans-
formation and modernisation to be able to add substance to the regular multi-
lateral meetings. Furthermore, some issues, for example energy co-operation,
are addressed as part of other multilateral bodies. The Thematic Platforms are
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13 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 2009, 
http://www.rpo.gov.pl/pliki/12659747270.pdf
also lacking the funds to be able to embark on activities other than organising
educational workshops and seminars and sharing know-how. Their impact on
the flagship projects is minimal because the projects are initiated by the Euro -
pean Commission and are consulted via channels independent from the Plat -
forms. In effect, the Platforms can dispose of the instruments necessary for the
implementation of their work programmes to a very limited extent. Thus the
programmes have become merely a set of purely political guidelines. 
The implementation of specific projects is to provide important added value in
multilateral co -operation as part of the Eastern Partnership. However, it is dif-
ficult to assess the Partnership’s performance in this area. Although all the flag-
ship initiatives (with the exception of the energy initiative, which Armenia is
in opposition to) have been set in motion within the first eighteen months
since the launch of this project, a very small part of the funds to be spent on
them as part of the present financial perspective has been allocated to the
implementation of multilateral projects as part of the Eastern Partnership until
the end of 2010 (a total of approximately 24 million euros was allocated in 2010
to both bilateral and multilateral activities as part of the Eastern Partnership).
Nevertheless, larger tenders for projects are planned to be announced starting
in 2011, when – according to Commissioner Štefan Füle’s promises – larger
funds will be disbursed from the pool allocated to the Eastern Partnership.
Funds from other sources are also routed to the Eastern Partnership; an agree-
ment envisaging the allocation of approximately 350 million euros to the flag-
ship initiative ‘Small and Medium-sized Enterprises’ was signed with the EIB
and EBRD in the second half of 2010. 
8. The EU with regard to Eastern European societies
All official ENP documents emphasise the great significance of co-operation at
the level of society and of developing ties between ordinary citizens of the part-
ner countries and the EU member states. This objective with regard to the East
is attained primarily through scholarships (mainly the Erasmus Mundus pro-
gramme) and co-operation involving young people (the Youth in Action pro-
gramme). The two programmes, highly important as they are, still have a very
limited scope and cover annually around 2,500 people from all the Eastern Euro-
pean countries. The EU also offers significantly less scholarships than are needed
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in individual countries. In turn, in the case of the Youth in Action programme,
the Eastern partners’ room for action is limited since they may not initiate proj-
ects (organisations from these countries are not authorised to file applications
and thus act as coordinators of projects). 
Other activities which the EU sees as being important goals of its policy include
establishing closer co-operation between civil organisations from the member
states and Eastern Europe, and increasing the potential of those from Eastern
Europe. The EU also views influence on government policies as an important
goal of its policy. These goals are attained for example by allowing non-govern -
mental organisations from the partner states to join in (through various kinds
of consultations) concept work and evaluation of EU policies with regard to the
region, and by financing the projects they implement. However, representa-
tives of the non-governmental sector from the Eastern neighbourhood coun-
tries point out that their access to information in some important areas is still
very limited (for example, regarding the details of the projects financed by the
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Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Belarus
Moldova
Ukraine
ENP East 
(% of the total quantity
as part of the ENP)
Number of 
scholarships as part 
of Erasmus Mundus
programme 2009/2010*
48
36
67
72
77
127
427 (39.7%)
Percentage of received
applications for Erasmus
Mundus scholarships (com-
ponent 1) for 2009/2010**
15%
6%
15.5%
7.6%
8%
9.6%
-
Number of people 
covered by the Youth 
in Action programme 
in 2009 ***
351  
231  
344 
221
309
641 
2097 (70%)
Erasmus Mundus and Youth in Action programmes with regard to Eastern Europe
*The data cover component 1 (Master’s and Doctorate scholarships) and component 2 
(Masters scholarships and professional training)
** Author’s own calculations based on the statistical data of Erasmus Mundus Programme
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/erasmus_mundus/results_compendia/statistics_en.php
*** Source: Communication from the European Commission to the European Parliament 
and the European Council: Taking Stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2009
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2010/sec10_513_en.pdf
European Commission or budget aid), which impedes and sometimes even pre-
vents the independent monitoring of the ENP’s implementation14. The insuffi-
ciency of funds available to social organisation is also a problem. Most of the
money distributed by EU delegations in Eastern neighbourhood countries to be
spent on civil society purposes originate from the European Instrument for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and is allocated to projects related to
human rights and democratisation, which especially in the cases of the most ad -
vanced partners (such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) seems to be insufficient.
The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership was also initiated in 2009.
The Forum and the organisations engaged in it managed to institutionalise it
within the first year of its operation. Thematic groups corresponding to the
four Eastern Partnership intergovernmental platforms and working subgroups,
whose goal is to coordinate non-governmental activities in the EU and partner
states regarding issues which are given high priority by social organisations
(for example, respect for human rights or liberalisation of the visa regime) were
created. A Steering Committee consisting of 17 individuals, elected at the annu-
al meeting of the Civil Society Forum, is in charge of coordinating all activities
of the Forum. This Forum has received support from the European Commission,
which has co-organised and financed its annual conventions, working group
meetings and sessions of the Steering Committee. 
However, aside from the undeniable achievements, one can already see the chal -
lenges the Forum is facing more than one year since the beginning of its opera -
tion. Its further development requires logistical and technical support, which can
be provided by a permanent secretariat. Another challenge is posed by the un -
even development of this initiative across the partner states: The best-developed
national platforms of the Civil Society Forum are in Belarus and Armenia. This is
linked on the one hand to the different potentials of the non-governmental sec-
tors in various Eastern Partnership countries (Azerbaijan has the weakest) and
on the other to the existence of alternative pro-EU forums at which non-gov-
ernmental organisations from these countries can co-operate (Moldova and
Ukraine have the best-developed structures of this kind). 
Nevertheless, the key problems the Civil Society Forum addresses are analogous
to those local which non-governmental organisations point out with regard to
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14 Missing Out: Civil Society and ENPI, ICPS newsletter, 29 June 2010
http://www.icps.com.ua/files/articles/58/6/nl_eng_20100629_0476.pdf
the ENP. They concern, firstly, the lack of access to information on actions taken
at the governmental level (for example, activities as part of the Eastern Partner -
ship’s Thematic Platforms) and, secondly, the very limited possibility of backing
multilateral non-governmental projects with EU funds. Moreover, even if such
projects can be implemented, their profile is defined in a top-down way in ten-
ders announced by the European Commission. However, there are no mecha-
nisms which would enable the generation of proposals for common civil activi -
ties in a grassroots way. Meanwhile, this need seems to be of key significance
for an active and innovative co-operation of non-governmental organisations
both as part of the Forum and outside it.
9. The money language
After the collapse of the USSR, financial aid for Eastern Europe was mainly pro-
vided as part of TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Inde pen -
dent States), which covered all the CIS countries and Mongolia. A partial reform
of external action financial instruments was carried out in the EU during the
pre paration of the New Financial Perspective 2007–2013. This also affected the
Eastern neighbourhood area. Since 2007, aid funds for Eastern European and
Southern Caucasus countries have been provided mostly as part of the Euro pean
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The instrument covers
Ukra i ne, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and those
North African countries to which the ENP is addressed. 
The ENPI funds available as part of the present financial perspective have been
divided in advance into a part allocated to the Eastern and Southern neigh-
bourhood and a supra-regional part. The former part is used to financially sup-
port bilateral, regional and cross-border projects for Eastern Europe and Russia.
In turn, the supra-regional part offers funds to Eastern (and also Southern) neigh-
bours for such projects as TAIEX, Twinning and SIGMA15. The Governance Facili ty,
which is available as part of the ENPI and is used to support the most advanced
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15 TAIEX: the Technical Assistance and Information Exchange instrument, Twinning and SIGMA are
the programmes focused on building modern state administration. 
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Funds
11.2 billion*
Around 4 billion
2.51 billion 
423 million
485 million 
1.23 billion (450 million
reserved for the NIF) 
700 million + contribution
from member states (around
40-50 million at present)
350 million 
350 million of additional 
funds from the budget reserve 
(+250 million advanced 
as part of the ENPI)
524 million
3.7 billion
1.5 billion
Financial Facilities
Bilateral-East
Cross-border-East
Regional-East
Supra-regional
Neighbourhood Investment
Facility (NIF)
Governance Facility
Eastern Partnership 
Nuclear Safety Co-operation
Instrument 
European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR)
Instrument for Stability
Development and Co-operation
Instrument
Macroeconomic aid
EIB (loans as part of the mandate
covering the Eastern neighbours 
of the EU)
EIB loans granted as part 
of the Eastern Partners Facility
(aimed at supporting 
EU investments in the region)
Beneficiaries
ENP 17 + Russia
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Russia
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Russia
ENP 17 
ENP 17 
Only those ENP countries which
have signed the Action Plans
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
Global 
(mainly Russia and Ukraine)
Global
Global
Global
Global
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Russia
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Russia
The EU financial support and EIB loans to Eastern European countries in 2007–2013
ENPI
* “Regulation (EC) No. 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 
laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument”, 
article 29, which specifies the amount of 11,181,000,000 euros as the financial envelope of the ENPI), 
does not proved for the 350 million euros allocated to the Eastern Partnership.
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Financial
Facility
ENPI¹
IPA²
Countries*
Eastern neighbours + Russia*
Eastern neighbours without Russia * 
Moldova
Armenia
Georgia
Azerbaijan
Ukraine
Belarus**
Russia
Southern neighbours
Western Balkans
Turkey 
Average annual 
assistance
362.35 million
328.06 million
68.98 million
36.53 million
42.96 million
30.64 million
137.79 million
11.17 million
34.29 million
800.54 million
745.42 million
696.12 million                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Annual assistance 
per capita
3
4.36
15.98
12.31
9.34
3.69
3.03
1.16
0.25
3.85
31.07
8.95
Funds available as part of bilateral assistance from the European Neighbourhood 
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
(IPA), 2007–2013
Demographic data for 2010 based on the CIA World Factbook used for these calculations. 
¹ Data taken from the National Indicative Programme documents for individual countries 
in two periods, 2007-2010 and 2011-2013, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm
² The data have been taken from the Communication from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament: Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), Multi-annual
Indicative Financial Framework for 2011-2013,
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/comm_pdf_com_
2009_0543_f_communication_en.pdf
* Funds allocated to Russia, on the assumption that the ENPI assistance in 2011-2013 will
reach 120 million euros as in 2007-2010.
** Funds allocated to Belarus on the basis of ENPI information
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_belarus_en.pdf: 5 million euros in 2007, 
5 million euros in 2008, 10 million euros in 2009, 10 million euros in 2010, and 16.07 million
euros in 2011, on the assumption that the amounts allocated in the following years will not be
lower than in 2011.
partners in the area of good governance, and the Neighbourhood Investment
Facility, which provides funds to stimulate and prepare investments (which are
later financed mainly with EIB loans), are also supra-regional projects. Addi tio -
nally, Eastern Europe receives financial support as part of thematic instruments,
including the EIDHR, and loans from the EIB. 
The level of financial assistance offered to the neighbours, including Eastern
Eu rope, has significantly increased in comparison to the previous financial per-
spective. Around 4 billion euros has been allocated to the six eastern ENP coun-
tries and Russia as part of the ENPI to be used in 2007 – 2013 (for comparison,
the TACIS funds which were made available to the entire CIS and Mongolia in
2000-2006 were worth 3.1 billion euros). The loan facilities available from the
EIB for the same period are to reach 3.7 billion euros (loans worth 0.6 billion
euros were available to the countries covered by TACIS in 2000-2006). 
At the same time, Eastern European countries receive clearly lower financial
support as part of bilateral assistance than other neighbouring regions. The
total funds to be spent on bilateral assistance to the Eastern neighbours is equi -
valent to as little as 45% of the sum allocated to the Southern neighbours. The
disproportion is even greater when one compares the levels of support offered
by the EU to the Eastern neighbours and the Western Balkan countries. The
funds available to the Western Balkans as part of bilateral assistance are worth
two times as much as those allocated to Eastern Europe. This means that the
value of assistance per capita offered to them is seven times higher. 
The levels of bilateral assistance are also significantly diversified within the re -
gion. Ukraine gets the largest part. However, when calculated according to the
number of residents, the level of support it receives is the second lowest after
Belarus. Moldova has the highest per capita rate (fifteen times higher than Be -
larus and five times higher than Ukraine). Thus, the funding logic is to some ex-
tent correlated to the progress made by a given country in relations with the EU
(in this context, the relatively low assistance to Georgia and high to Armenia is
quite puzzling). Bilateral funds are divided at the onset of the financial per-
spective (both between the regions and initially between the countries), which
offers quite limited possibilities of flexible response to events and the applica-
tion of the conditionality mechanism. In 2007-2010, a sum as low as 50 million
euros was allocated as part of the Governance Facility for ‘rewarding’ the coun-
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tries which made especially big progress in democratic and state institution
reforms. At the same time, the EU may ‘reward’ or respond to emergencies by
granting extra funds for macroeconomic assistance (for example, it gave 90
mil lion euros to Moldova in 2010) or special aid packages, as it did with Geor -
gia, which was offered 500 million euros for reconstruction after the war.
10. Responding to crises
Geographic proximity has certainly made the EU more exposed to the conse-
quences of crisis situations in Eastern Europe and at the same time more res -
ponsible for the way they are handled: since 2004, the eyes of the international
community and the countries concerned themselves are more and more often
on Brussels whenever a crisis situation occurs. 
The EU’s reactions and possibilities have been different in each of the three types
of crisis situations happening in Eastern Europe: (1) crises linked to elections
(public protests and waves of repression), (2) energy conflicts, and (3) problems
related to separatism and para-states. 
1. As regards post-election crises, the EU played the most active part during the
Orange Revolution in 2004 in Ukraine. For example, it was engaged in a media -
tion mission (the EU representative for common foreign and security policy, Ja -
vier Solana, participated as a negotiator in the three rounds of the talks be tween
the two conflicting parties) and a monitoring mission (the European Parliament
sent its observers to watch the repeated runoff of the presidential election).
The EU also addressed the issue of the Ukrainian crisis during the summit with
Russia on 25 November 2004 and made it clear that it would not accept the
result of the fixed election in Ukraine and opposed Russian pressure in the form
of support for only one candidate. It can be stated that the EU’s engagement
contributed to the achievement of the compromise, one element of which was
the re-holding of the presidential runoff in compliance with democratic standards.
This engagement was possible to a great extent owing to the special activity of
individual EU member states (first of all Poland and Lithuania), which encourag-
ed EU representatives to take more radical steps. However, the reaction from
Brussels to many other crises was usually limited to appealing for a peaceful
and democratic resolution of the conflict. The EU’s indecision was often linked
to the difficulty of making a clear choice: to what extent it should risk further
O S W  S t u d i e s
P
a
rt
 I
I.
 T
h
e
 E
a
s
te
rn
 v
e
c
to
r 
o
f 
th
e
 n
e
ig
h
b
o
u
rh
o
o
d
 p
o
li
c
y
50
escalation of the crisis and support the ‘subversive’ actions of the regime’s op -
ponents in the name of democratic values and to what extent it should aim at
soothing and stabilising the situation. This dilemma was especially evident at
the time of the most recent post-election crisis in Moldova in spring 2009. The
EU seemed to be then more inclined to ensure stability even if it would have
had to accept the use of force by the Moldovan government. 
Challenges to EU policy have been posed not only by post-election crises but also
by brutal repressions used by some states against their citizens who participate
in demonstrations and political opposition before and after elections. In this case,
the inconsistency in the treatment of individual Eastern neighbourhood coun-
tries is also noteworthy. The repressions Belarus resorted to in 2004 and 2010
were criticised very sharply by the EU and caused a temporary freezing of rela-
tions with the regime and the imposition of visa sanctions on Lukashenka’s
associates. Meanwhile, the opposition was treated in an almost equally radical
way by the authorities in Azerbaijan in 2005 and in Armenia in 2008, which met
with critical political declarations but did not entail any sanctions or restrictions
on the implementation of the ENP with regard to these countries. 
2. Similarly, the European Community mainly used political pressure on the con-
flicting parties when addressing problems with oil and gas supplies caused by
Russia’s disputes with Ukraine or Belarus. The EU also attempted to take long-
term preventive measures and to alleviate the consequences of potential new
crises. For example, the ‘early warning mechanism’, as part of which Russia was
to give advance notification of possible breaks in oil and gas supplies, was creat-
ed. After the gas crisis in 2008, the EU offered Ukraine the possibility to access
investment funds (approximately 2.2 billion euros) in exchange for the moder -
nisation of its energy sector in compliance with EU standards. This reform was
to prevent any potential crises in the future caused partly by the non-trans-
parent solutions applied in the Ukrainian gas sector both internally and in deal-
ings with Russia. Although the Ukrainian government at first reacted positive-
ly to this proposal, it did not implement it in practice as it was unable to carry
out the necessary reforms. 
3. The EU showed greatest engagement in situations related to ‘separatism’
during the Russia-Georgia war, which lasted a few days and which was caused
by the conflict over Southern Ossetia. The EU contributed to the development
of the armistice and its acceptance by both parties, owing to which it became
possible to stabilise the situation and persuade Russia to withdraw its troops
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from Georgia proper (however, contrary to the arrangements, the troops were
not moved back to their place of deployment before the war). A few days after
the end of the conflict, around 250 EU observers were sent to Georgia, who
since that time have been the only external mission to monitor the situation in
the conflict region until now (however, the observers are not allowed to enter
the separatist republics). The EU’s strong presence during the settlement of this
conflict was possible, as it was in the case of the Orange Revolution, mainly
owing to the engagement by several member states particularly interested in
this issue, especially France, which was holding the EU presidency at that time. 
The EU participates or is an observer in multilateral negotiations as part of the
5 + 2 format (the conflicting parties, Russia, Ukraine, the OSCE + the USA and
the EU) regarding the conflict in Transnistria (this format in fact has not been
functioning since 2006). It also participates in the Geneva talks initiated after
the Georgia-Russia war. The EU has also taken long-term activities focused on
a single target. One example of this is the European Border Assistance Mission
(EUBAM) operating at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, including its Trans ni strian
section, which was initiated in 2005. This mission is targeted at improving the
standards of operation of the customs officers and border guards and thus re -
ducing cross-border crime linked to the existence of the Transnistrian separatism. 
However, in general, the EU has very limited possibilities to influence the situa -
tions resulting from separatism. Firstly, to break the deadlock over the frozen
conflicts, a very strong engagement extending beyond political declarations would
be required (for example, sending monitoring or peacekeeping missions to the
frozen conflict areas), which would entail higher costs, which the EU appears
unready to incur. Secondly, the existence of the separatisms is strongly linked
to the Russian policy aimed at keeping the countries from this region within its
zone of influence. At present, the EU is lacking the political will necessary to
raise this issue in a more unequivocal way since this would cause serious ten-
sion in relations with Russia (this happened during the Orange Revolution and
the Russia-Georgia war). Avoiding this problem, which strategy the EU seems
to have been pursuing over the past two years, has lead to the de facto turning
of a blind eye on Moscow’s policy (for example, the deployment of Russian
troops in territories of other countries contrary to their will). In turn, this in
fact prevents any efficient action aimed at resolving the crises. 
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11. Conclusion: the integration deficit
The EU has certainly intensified its activity with regard to Eastern Europe since
2004. Bilateral contacts have become more active, and multilateral co-opera-
tion institutions have been created. The EU has also significantly increased its
engagement in crisis situations in the region (for example, a post-conflict mon-
itoring mission was sent to a country in the Eastern neighbourhood for the first
time). New financial facilities have been created allowing for more diversified
forms of assistance, including direct budgetary support, and the reinforcement
of certain state institutions. The value of the funds to be both spent as aid and
allocated to preferential loans (for example, from the EIB) has increased.
These activities have led first of all to the development of a network of contacts
and a set of instruments for policy implementation. The EU has also taken some
preventive actions to stop conflict escalation and hold back authoritarian ten-
dencies in the region. However, the real integration process has been very lim-
ited. Ukraine’s accession to the WTO (which was a precondition for the launch
of the DCFTA negotiations) and the sectoral agreements establishing more flex-
ible visa regimes with four partner countries (visa facilitations in exchange for
readmission agreements) can be named among the major successes in this area.
Most of the integration projects the PCA and the Action Plans envisaged have
not been implemented. Although negotiations of new, much more ambitious
Association Agreements have been set on track, problems have already appear ed
at this stage; negotiations regarding the most important element of the AA, the
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, have been underway for almost three
years with Ukraine, and the date of their finalisation has still not been deter-
mined. Meanwhile, the signing of the agreement would be only the first step
towards its implementation. It needs to be ratified by all EU member states (in
the case of the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements the period between
their signing and effective dates lasted nearly three years.
It appears that one of the main causes of this situation has been the dispropor -
tion between the policy’s ambitions, the challenges it needs to face and the in -
struments available to it. 
The underlying assumption is that the European Union’s policy towards East -
ern Europe since 2004 has been to extend beyond ordinary co-operation be -
tween neighbours and to implement one of the most ambitious goals one can
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set in international relations: to lead to the building of modern states in the
immediate neighbourhood of the EU according to the model developed by West-
ern European countries. So this is to be a continuation of the Eurocentrist moder -
nisation policy the European Community has been pursuing for decades. 
However, this is the first time this policy is to be implemented with significant ly
less instruments available than before. First of all, it does not offer membership
perspectives. As a result, much lower financial support (than in the case of coun -
tries which have a chance for accession) is being offered. It is also impossible
to fully apply the conditionality mechanisms, including the mechanism which
refers to the concrete obligation of regular monitoring and progress evaluation.
However, the reductions concern many more issues than these. The offer of ‘shar-
ing everything but institutions’ made in the first half of this decade is no longer
valid because the EU is reluctant to open its sensitive sectors, introduce a visa-
free regime, etc. This indicates that the EU has an ambivalent approach. On the
one hand, it wants integration and on the other is appears uncertain whether
it makes sense at all and is taking a defensive attitude, trying to protect itself
from becoming open to its neighbours. 
The concern about the membership aspirations of the Eastern neighbours has
also led to the de-Europeanisation of the policy towards Eastern Europe. Clear
statements whether three countries from this region are part of Europe and ref-
erences to the idea of a united Europe have been avoided in EU documents. This
has inhibited the full usage of their potential related to their European identi-
ty. This way the EU has deprived itself of an important instrument which could
have generated political will in the integration process.
Another problem in EU policy has been the impossibility to adopt a consistent
and clear stance on the promotion of European values. The EU has been caught
in a double bind between the feeling that it should condemn authoritarian ten-
dencies and support grassroots democratic movements and on the other hand
the temptation to choose stability and business benefits resulting from good
co-operation with the governments (regardless of their attitude to democracy). 
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Postscript. How to avoid the pretence?
Seven years since the launch of the ENP, the policy of the Eastern neighbour-
hood’s ‘external’ integration formulated by the European Union is facing very
serious challenges. It is becoming increasingly likely that relations between the
European Community and Eastern European countries will turn into a pretence
aimed only at imitating integration. In the short run, this pretence may turn
out to be beneficial for both parties. However, in the longer term, this may lead
to a weakening of the EU’s position not only locally but also globally. To pre-
vent the situation from developing in this direction it is necessary to revise the
EU’s policy. At the same time, it is worth noting that a revision per se will not
guarantee success since very much depends on the partner countries. 
Contrary to what is usually assumed, it is not true that the EU’s possibilities in
dealings with the Eastern neighbours must remain very limited due to the lack of
a clear offer of membership perspectives. However, the opinion that strategic
issues may be disregarded and the policy can be restricted only to technocratic
moves (negotiating new legal frameworks and creating institutions and proce-
dures) is equally unreasonable. A revival of the EU’s policy towards its Eastern
Neighbours on the one hand requires long-term consideration, which will make
the policy more legible and boost the political will for its implementation in both
the EU and the partner countries. However, on the other hand, innovative funda-
mental actions are necessary to enable the use of the instruments available to the
EU to the maximum extent and at the same time to reduce those areas of activity
which will not bring measurable effects and only consume the already scarce
political and financial resources allocated to the Eastern dimension of the ENP. 
Redefining the strategic message
A fundamental problem in the policy towards the Eastern neighbourhood is the
deficiency in the political will for integration from both the partners and the
European Union. Redefining the previous political message could be one of the
key factors which could contribute to improving the attitude to this policy. It
seems reasonable to give up focusing the strategy on the idea of Europe’s
neighbourhood (as the name of the European Neighbourhood Policy indicates).
This approach is strongly demotivating for the partner states and to some ex tent
also to EU member states as it presumes in advance the existence of divides in
relations between the EU and Eastern Europe by presenting Eastern Europe as
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‘surroundings’, thus the peripheries of the EU. Drawing on the idea of a ‘united
Europe’ appears much more attractive and likely to inspire the wish to draw
closer to the EU. It needs to be emphasised that a ‘united Europe’ should not
be identified with the European Union (and thus a membership offer) but de -
fined as a community of standards, values and, consequently, also interests in
relations with the world outside Europe. 
More decisive diversification
The relatively limited offer the European Community presents to the neighbour
countries is undoubtedly one of its weaknesses. This could be partly remedied by
applying a more decisive diversification. On the one hand this would mean giving
up (or slowing down, in the case where previous measures cannot be rescinded)
those actions aimed at creating new instruments which produce no measurable
effects (for example, Association Agreements with countries which are not interest -
ed in integration, or the development of an excessive number of multilateral bod-
ies). On the other hand, those countries which are interested in integration should
be encouraged through: (1) launching the available instruments as soon as possi-
ble (at present, starting the DCFTA negotiations with Moldova and Georgia and
granting Georgia an Action Plan for a visa-free regime are of key significance);
(2) declaring firmly that, as modernisation progress is made, the EU will open up
the agricultural sector to them, introduce the free movement of people and under-
take the process of building privileged institutional relations.
Broader opening up at the level of society 
It also seems worthwhile to put a stronger emphasis on policy targeted at soci-
ety in the neighbour countries. Three lines of action are possible in this area:
(1) Increasing access to EU programmes, such as the Culture Programme, the
European Voluntary Service or Europe for Citizens, and also broadening the
availability of the already opened up programmes, such as for example Youth
in Action (so that the Eastern partners may initiate projects). (2) Granting more
effective support to civil organisations. This requires not only money but also
a redefining of the existing instruments to stimulate self-reliance and not de -
pendence. This requires for example civil organisations to be offered greater
access to information at the governmental level (for example, the activity of the
Thematic Platforms of the Eastern Partnership) and the creation of mechanisms
to enable proposals to be conceived for common civilian action at grassroots
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level. The latter seems to be of key significance for an active and innovative co-
operation between nongovernmental organisations both in Eastern Europe and
between such organisations from the neighbour countries and EU member states.
(3) Offering firm support to grassroots protest movements against autho ri ta -
rian regimes. It has become clear over the past five years that post-election
crises in Eastern European countries are the most successful means of holding
back authoritarian tendencies in this region. The level of stability of these coun-
tries is such that events of this type– although beyond any doubt being proof
of the weakness of government structures– do not cause uncontrolled institu-
tional chaos. Given these experiences, it seems that fear of destabilisation in
crisis situations should not limit the EU’s pro-democracy actions. These crises
should be seen as a display of the democratic potential rather than a source of
threat to stability of the EU’s neighbourhood. 
Entrenchment of multilateral institutions
It is evident after more than a year that a clear concept regarding the goals and
the formula of operation of multilateral institutions as part of the Eastern Part -
nership, and especially the Thematic Platforms, is missing. This may lead in the
future to a gradual loss of the feeling that these meetings make sense (which
has already happened to many multilateral institutions operating as part of the
Barcelona Process). It appears that this problem could be resolved by strength-
ening the link between the work of the Platforms and the planning and con-
sulting of projects implemented as part of the Eastern Partnership, including
those related to flagship initiatives, and by developing mechanisms which
would allow the European Commission to absorb the ideas for projects pro-
posed by participants of the platforms. 
Refraining from a declaration of increased engagement in frozen conflicts
In turn, it appears inadvisable to make a rash declaration of an increase in the
present level of engagement in issue of frozen conflicts (which many experts
have recently encouraged). The EU is still lacking the leverage and political will
necessary to confront Russia in this field. Given this situation, any attempts at
intensifying the EU’s security policy towards para-states are doomed to failure
and may only undermine the European Community’s credibility. 
Katarzyna Pełczyƒska-Nał´cz
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